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Religion: A Rorschachian Projection Theory 
Abstract 
This paper offers a projection theory of religion based 
on an experiential analysis of Rorschach's human movement 
response. An experiential analysis of the movement response 
reveals an understanding of projection particularly appro-
priate for the study of religion. The relevance of Rorscha-
chian projection to religion is due to several reasons related 
primarily to the fact that projection and religion share epi-
stemological concerns. First, because of its epistemological 
optimism regarding the knowledge of otherness, projection 
provides a legitimate means of understanding (radical) 
otherness. Second, in projection, knowledge of the other 
occurs through knowledge of the self, encompassing the 
same epistemological processes emphasized in contemporary 
theological interpretations of divine otherness. Third, Ror-
schachian projection can accommodate both theistic and 
non-theistic traditions in its understanding of religion since 
projection and religion are both attempts to formulate the 
nature of selfhood, otherness, and their relationship. Finally, 
a discussion of the origins of the human movement response 
and religious experience establishes a further link between 
the two. It is due to their common origin in early object 
relations that Rorschachian projection (the movement re-
sponse) is most applicable to the understanding of religion. 
Both projection and religion emerge from a transitional or 
transcendent realm between self and other. Object relations 
theory enables us to extrapolate toward both culture and 
epistemology from Rorschach's movement response. 
Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach (1884-1922) is 
well known for his development of the inkblot test as a tool 
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in clinical diagnosis. However, few are aware of the psychol-
ogy of religion he began to create in his published writings but 
did not live to complete. Vitally interested in the psychology of 
religion, Rorschach spent three years intensively studying two 
religious sects of Switzerland. His correspondence indicates 
that he intended to publish a book on the subject. Rorschach 
felt that the psychology of religion would be his major area of 
concentration: In 1914, "the young psychiatrist reported en-
thusiastically about his research; he firmly believed that this 
study of Swiss sects would be his life work." 1 Some of his pre-
liminary findings are outlined in papers presented at confer-
ences between 1916 and 1919.2 
Rorschach's interest in religion is evident throughout 
his professional career. His psychological writings incorpo-
rate several themes related to religion. Early publications 
include articles on m ythology and religious symbolism in 
Swiss folklore ;3 he also focused on religious imagery in the 
delusions of his patients.4 In his later writings, he began to 
comment on comparative mythology, the history of reli-
gions and spirituaUmystical experience.5 Although it may be 
impossible to recreate Hermann Rorschach's uncompleted 
theory of the psychology of religion, one trajectory within 
Rorschach's thought can be pursued. T his is his association 
of the human movement response with religion. 
In the Rorschach test, the human movement response, 
M, involves the interpretation of an ambiguous stimulus 
(the inkblot) as a human figure in motion. Rorschach believed 
that movement responses were indicative of intelligence, 
mental productivity, and creative potential. He also de-
scribed the human movement response as intimately linked 
with religion: 
T his component of intelligence (M) can be nothing 
other than the ability to create new individual produc-
tions, the capacity for "inner creation." In its finest de-
velopments we call this artistic inspiration, religious ex-
perience, etc. 
He also relates the movement response to revelation: 
A broadening of the experience type ... in the d irection 
of introversion (a predominance of M responses) ... is, 
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depending on the degree, called "inner creation," or in-
spiration, or even revelation.6 
Few subsequent studies have inquired into the relation-
ship of movement responsivity and religion . As psychologist 
E. Bohm notes: "For reasons as yet unknown, M is corre-
lated with the creative powers of the personality and also 
with religious experience."7 T his paper suggests that Ror-
schach's intuition in linking religion and the movement re-
sponse was cor rect: implicit in the movement response is a 
notion of projection which is uniquely appropr iate for un-
derstanding religion. T his paper also inquires into the "rea-
sons as yet u nknown" for the association of religion and the 
movement response, su ggesting that religious experience 
and movement responsivity have a common origin in early 
object relations. A dual intent, therefore, underlies this 
paper. I t creates a projection theory of religion based on 
Rorschach 's movement response; and it grounds that theory 
in developmental concerns, seeking the origins of the hu-
man movement response, projective knowing, and religion 
in the narcissistic period of human development. 
Religion and Projection 
Psychological theories of religion, especially psychoana-
lytic approaches, have viewed religion primarily as p rojec-
tion. In Freud's classic statement, religion is called "nothing 
but psychology proj ected into the external world" : 
I believe that a large par t of the mythological conception 
of the world, which extends a long way into the most 
modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected 
into the external world . . . . One could venture to ex-
plain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of 
man, of God , of good and evil, of immortality, and so on, 
and to transfo rm metaphysics into metapsychology.8 
Psychological theor ies of religion as proj ection are based on 
the clinical model of projection as distorted perception due 
to repressed elements of the psyche. Religion is therefore 
assumed to be distorted or wrong. In Freud 's view, projec-
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tion is a defense mechanism, by which we externalize the 
repressed, projecting only the qualities, drives or feelings of 
which we are not aware. Freud also expressed a second view 
of projection in some of his writings. In Totem and Taboo, for 
example, he noted that "projection is not specifically 
created for the purpose of defense . . . but is a mechanism 
which has the greatest share in shaping our outer world ."9 
The important feature of this second view is that inner 
rejection or repression of a feeling is not necessary for pro-
jection to occur. Here Freud implies that projection is a 
normal process, an inevitable process in the perception of 
the world. Thus there are two views of projection in Freud's 
work: a positive view and a negative view. 
Lindzey describes Freud's two views as classic projection 
and generalized projection. Classic projection is 
an unconscious and pathological process whereby the 
individual defends against unacceptable impulses or 
qualities in himself by inaccurately ascribing them to 
individuals or objects in the outer world .... General-
ized projection (is) ... a normal process whereby the 
individual's inner states or qualities influence his per-
ception and interpretation of the outer world. 10 
According to Lindzey, generalized projection underlies the 
"proj ective techniques such as the Rorschach Test." 
A closer look at this understanding of projection, how-
ever, reveals the inadequacy of "generalized projection" as a 
description of the process of perception which discloses per-
sonality in the Rorschach test. In the "projective testing lit-
erature" projection is defined neutrally as a normal process 
of externalization which reveals character and personality. 
T he underlying metaphor is one of a projector shining an 
image onto a blank screen: "The concept of projection as 
used in the projective procedures is ... formed on the pat-
tern of projector and blank screen." This interpretation of 
projection, however, 
may lead to a faulty assumption that the testee, rather 
than encountering something and somebody in the 
world and experiencing and interacting with what he 
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encounters, is faced with a blank screen on which he 
projects only his own subjectivity . .. . Actually it is the 
encounter of the testee with the inkblots (which are 
ambiguous but not unstructured) in the setting of the 
test situation, and his experience of and reactions to 
this encounter that we study when interpreting a Ror-
schach record. 11 
Thus neither the pathology model (classic projection) nor 
the conflict-free model (generalized projection) are appro-
priate metaphors for the processes involved in the Ror-
schach test. The first is inappropriate because it assumes 
distortion and pathology; the second because the blank 
screen metaphor ignores the interactive reality of the Ror-
schach test encounter. 
Freud's attitude to religion, and the attitude of most 
later psychoanalytic thinkers, partakes of the first view, clas-
sic projection. The use of the second metaphor of projec-
tion, generalized projection or blank screen to understand 
religion, is fa r less common, but it has been attempted. 12 
However, just as both classic projection and generalized 
projection are inappropriate ways of understanding the 
Rorschach test, I believe that both provide limited means of 
understanding religion. A third understanding of projec-
tion might more accurately describe Rorschach processes 
and might contribute a more valuable tool for the study of 
religion. In this attempt to redefine projection along Ror-
schachian lines, Schachtel's Experiential Foundations of Ror-
schach's Test will provide invaluable insights. 
Schachtel defines projection as 
that psychic mechanism by which one attributes quali-
ties, feelings, attitudes, and strivings of his own to ob-
j ects (people and things) of his environment. This may 
lead to the actual perception or to the assumption of 
the presence of these qualities in the objects of the envi-
ronment, and it may help or hinder an understanding 
of the object. 
According to this definition, projection plays no role at all 
in most of the "projective techniques." In the Rorschach test 
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only a small fraction of the many processes are of a prqjec-
tive nature. 
Not until the late 1930s was the Rorschach test called a 
projective technique. Rorschach himself called Psychodiag-
nostics neither a projective test nor a projective technique. 
He referred to the test as an "experiment in the diagnosis 
of perception" and as a "form-interpretation test. " He con-
sidered the test a revealing study of individual differences 
in perception and a contribution to the problem of percep-
tion and personality, not a projective test. Schachtel concurs 
with Rorschach's original estimation of the experiment as a 
test of perception and refrains from calling the Rorschach 
Test a projective test. He does, however, find tha.t projec-
tion is the process underlying Rorschach's movement re-
sponses. "The mechanism of projection ... is essential for 
an understanding of ... the kinesthetic responses." Let us 
look more closely at Schachtel's experiential analysis of the 
movement response and the psychology of projection. 
Experiential Understanding of the Movement Response 
Schachtel states that the implications of Rorschach's 
ideas about the movement response 
not only make it one of the most important tools for the 
analysis of character structure in the test; they also throw 
light on the nature of the mechanism of projection. 
In movement perception or kinesthetic perception, he 
explains, 
there is an element of projection. The subject under-
stands the movement ... that he perceives ... in terms 
of his own inner experience .... Thus his personal kin-
esthetic . . . feeling, aroused by what he sees, is pro-
jected onto the person or object seen and merges com-
pletely, without the subj ect being aware of it, with the 
percept of the person or object empathically perceived. 
Movement perception or projection can be broken down 
into the following steps: 1. the individual perceives an ob-
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ject (a person, a thing, or anything other than the self); 2. 
the object arouses a personal feeling; 3. the feeling is pro-
jected upon the object seen; 4. the projection merges com-
pletely with the percept of the object. T here is usually no 
awareness that this is anything other than a simple percep-
tion of an object. This may or may not produce accurate 
knowledge of the other. In kinesthetic perception or pro-
jection, therefore, the subject perceives the object through 
knowledge of himself: paradoxically, knowledge of reality is 
obtained through self-knowledge. 
According to Schachtel's experiential analysis, the ele-
ments of projection include anthropomorphic thinking, a 
connection with the experience of selfhood, epistemology, 
and reliance on somatic experience. The first three of these 
will be most appropriate to our discussion of religion as 
projection; all will contribute to our search for the roots of 
projective knowing in early object relations. 
Schachtel's view of projection involves the human ten-
dency toward anthropomorphic thinking, the tendency to 
"perceive and think of others in one's own image and to 
expect and to find one's likeness in others." Through an-
thropomorphism actual perception of the other can result. 
On the other hand, anthropomorphism can result in the 
mistaken assumption of the presence of qualities in the 
other: projection can help or hinder an understanding of 
the object. Distorted proj ection, due to anthropomorphism, 
constitutes one end of a continuum at the other end of 
which genuine understanding of others has its place. 
Kinesthetic perception or movement responsivity re-
sults in a kind of knowing wherein one experiences in 
oneself the sensation of movement that is perceived in the 
other. Rorschach noted that the movement must be felt 
(erfuhlt) , not merely named. An actual kinesthetic sensa-
tion, however slight, must be present, as if the subject 
were inside the figure seen. The perception of one's own 
body in the kinesthetic sensation is inextricably fused with 
the object of perception through the visual data received 
by the eye. In movement responsivity, body knowing or 
somatic experience is at the root of perception. Related to 
this body knowing is the experience of selfhood. Schach-
206 Diane Jonte-Pace 
tel associates movement perception with the "deepest 
trends in the personality." T his is based on two facts. 
First, only through kinesthetic sensations does the individ-
ual have "direct, immediate, physical experience of him-
self from within." Secondly, "every human feeling , atti-
tude, striving has both a physical and a mental side and 
finds expression in physiological and neuromuscular as 
well as in psychic processes." 13 T hus the movement re-
sponse represents a profound demension of knowing the 
self which is body-oriented. 
This mode of knowing, in effect, transcends the polar-
ity of self and other since it is through the self (body per-
ception) that we know the other in the movement response. 
Yet paradoxically we perceive this knowledge as commg 
from the other rather than from the self: 
the experiential perception of movement displays a 
strong sense of otherness which tends to bracket or 
suspend the more reflective recognition that . . . the 
origins of such a sense of otherness do in fact lie within 
oneself. 14 
This is Rorschach's epistemological paradox. It grapples 
with the question of selfhood, otherness and their relation-
ship in the process of knowing the other. 
Through an experiential analysis of projection in kines-
thetic perception (movement responses), it becomes clear 
that projection is a legitimate means of achieving knowledge 
of the other, and that this form of projection transcends the 
subject-object dichotomy, the polarity of self and other. 
Rorschach is "succeeding thus in that hitherto impossible 
task. He is bridging the gulf between the knower and the 
object of his knowledge, the Ding an Sich. " 15 Thus an experi-
ential analysis of the movement response allows us to con-
clude that movement responses represent projective know-
ing, that this form of perception involves knowing the other 
through knowledge of one's own body, that movement res-
ponsivity can be either accurate or inaccurate, and that 
movement responsivity is linked with the deepest trends in 
the personality. T he central mechanisms in projection thus 
involve the self, the other, and their relationship. Most sig-
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nificant in Rorschachian projection are epistemology and 
anthropomorphism. These two dimensions of projection 
make Rorschachian projection a particularly appropriate 
model for understanding religion. 
Epistemology 
The Rorschachian view of projection is essentially epis-
temological. It deals with the issue of knowledge of the 
other, asking how we, the subjects, have knowledge of ob-
jects in the external world. Projection is "an attempt to for-
mulate the nature of otherness." It inquires into 
the relation of knowledge derived from sensory experi-
ence about objects in the external world to knowledge 
derived from reflection upon those processes which 
constitute our internal awareness of ourselves. 16 
From an epistemological point of view, the negative view 
of projection is understood as a distortion of otherness. 
Through projection, Freud implied in his "classic" view of 
projection, we cannot accurately know the other, for projec-
tion involves unconscious repression of self and pathological 
distortion of otherness. In the negative view "the mistaken 
attribution of a quality or trait of which one is not aware 
in himself [is proj ected] onto others, thereby distorting real-
ity."17 Accurate knowledge of reality or of otherness is possi-
ble only by means of identifying one's projections, recogniz-
ing their distortions, and renouncing the projections. 
The view of projection implicit in the M response, how-
ever, d iffers substantially from the negative view of projec-
tion. First, inner rejection or repression of a quality or trait 
is not necessary for projection to occur. Secondly, projec-
tion can function as a step toward knowledge of otherness 
in which the subject defines the object. While projection 
appears to be an imposition of subjective elements on 
reality, (it) is in fact not a distortion at all. ... Projection 
arises from within, yet does not distort what is with-
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out. ... What is projected comes to lie between what is 
subject and what is object. 18 
The epistemological nature of projection is clear. In the 
lower view there is only a limited potential for knowledge of 
otherness while in the view of projection deduced from the 
movement response in the Rorschach test, non-distorted 
knowledge of otherness is a real possibility and projection is 
a legitimate component of knowing the other. 
Ptqjection is more than an attempt to formulate the 
nature of otherness: it is also an attempt to formulate the 
nature of selfhood. It is in an encounter between self and 
other that projective knowing occurs. Movement responses 
are intimately related to knowledge of selfhood: only 
through kinesthetic sensations do we have direct inner 
physical experience of ourselves. Several Rorschach theo-
rists in addition to Schachtel have made this point: 
Those kinesthesias which find their way into a person's 
movement responses are drawn from a repertoire of 
kinesthetic memories which express some of his core 
experiences of selfhood. 19 
Others similarly link M with a "tolerance for experiencing 
the self" and with the origin of the awareness of self: 
In the development of thought lies the origin of the 
awareness of the self and self concept since the delay of 
gratification and fantasy, M, clearly differentiates the 
organism from the immediate environmental situation. 
This differentiation makes possible more self-directed 
responses. 20 
Rorschach's emphasis on the necessity of a "felt movement" 
indicates that projective knowing involves an awareness of 
the physical sensation of movement in one's body, a body 
knowing. M thinking is body oriented thinking; M thinking 
involves somatic participation in perceptual experience. 
An epistemology of the body emerges: through our 
bodies we know ourselves and we know others. This body 
oriented knowing may have its origin in the infant's rela-
tionship with the mother. Rorschach's epistemological para-
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dox, the paradox that we perceive projective knowledge as 
coming from an external source rather than from our own 
bodies, an internal source, is resolvable when we postulate 
that the origin of that knowing is in the infant's undifferen-
tiated state where self and other, I and not-! are not experi-
enced as separate. The origins of movement responsivity 
and projection may lie in early object relations where the 
nature of selfhood, otherness, and their relationship is in-
itially formulated. This point will be developed later. 
Anthropomorphism 
The ongms of anthropomorphism in the Rorschach 
movement response are clear: a movement response in the 
Rorschach test involves the perception, in the ambiguous 
figure , of a human figure in motion. We project our human 
form, our anthropomorphic image, onto the inkblot, and 
we perceive that form dynamically. The human form is do-
ing something. 
Anthropomorphism refers to the tendency to think of 
the universe in human terms and to think of others in terms 
of one's own experience. Anthropomorphic thinking can be 
a legitimate means of understanding others. Through an-
thropomorphic thinking one understands the experience of 
another individual most deeply and most empathically: 
In every act of understanding something akin to one's 
own experience is felt in the other person. All under -
standing of others is made possible only by the fact that 
the other person is essentially like oneself, that .. . we 
are all much more simply human than otherwise. It is 
the essential likeness of man which is the basis of all 
real psychological understanding.21 
Anthropomorphism and epistemology are deeply inter-
twined in projection: it is through anthropomorphic think-
ing that true understanding or knowledge of otherness 
takes place. Knowledge of otherness (epistemology) and an-
thropomorphism, then are central components of projec-
tion. Otherness and anthropomorphism are also central 
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issues in theistic religions. T he two major elements in 
theism 's Imago Dei are the radical otherness or transcen-
dence of God and the personhood of God. Sharing these 
central concerns makes the vocabulary of projection a po-
tentially valuable tool for understanding theistic religions. 
Rorschachian Projection and Religion 
Two main points arc made in the following pages. First, 
Rorschachian projection is a valuable model for understand-
ing religion because of its epistemological dimension. Projec-
tion is a legitimate component of knowing reality, and it 
participates in the process of knowing the other through 
knowledge of the self. Secondly, the anthropomorphic di-
mension of projection makes it particularly relevant for the 
study of theistic reltions. However, it will be shown that pro-
jection is also relevant to the study of non-theistic religions. 
The Otherness of God 
Projection can function as a step toward knowledge of 
otherness. In a religious context, what is otherness? T he 
nature of otherness, the epistemological question regarding 
the possibility of knowing the other, and the relation of self 
and other, have been central concerns of religious thinkers, 
particularly Western theistic thinkers. 
In the Western, theistic, Judea-Christian tradition, God 
has traditionally been conceived as other or not-self, while 
self is not-God. Theistic doctrines of God's transcendence 
maintain the radical beyondness and otherness of the deity . 
Rudolph Otto's classic description of the divine or "numi-
nous" as the Ganz Andere, the Wholly Other, exemplifies this 
position. Otto saw God as transcendent, beyond, and other. 
He focused on humanity as a "creature" (created by 
another) who relates to God as an object outside the self. He 
called this object the numinous or Wholly Other, that which 
utterly transcends the mundane sphere. 
An epistemological point has emerged in recent de-
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scriptions of the mystery, the divine, or radical otherness. A 
reciprocal relationship is said to exist between knowledge of 
the other and knowledge of the self: 
T hroughout modern descriptions o f mystery by Otto, 
Buber, Marcel, and others, runs an epistemological 
theme: knowledge of "the other" is a precondition for 
knowledge of self and vice versa.22 
The Rorschachian model of projection is a particularly ap-
propriate tool for dealing with theistic religions, first be-
cause unlike previous psychological understandings of pro-
jection, it addresses the radical nature of religious otherness 
with the potential for true understanding, and secondly, 
because it encompasses the very process emphasized by con-
temporary understanding of divine otherness. That is, in 
Rorschachian projection, knowledge of the self is a precon-
dition for knowledge of the other and vice versa. A process 
of projection that transcends subject and object and that 
provides knowled ge of the other through knowledge of the 
self is particularly relevant for theistic religions wherein the 
divine is radically other and wherein knowledge of self and 
other (God) are mutually interdependent. 
The epistemological nature of projection makes it par-
ticularly valuable for the study of religion because both 
Rorschachian projection and religion attempt to conceptu-
alize the nature and knowability of selfhood and otherness. 
Religion and Rorschachian projection share an additional 
agenda as well: anthropomorphism. 
The Personhood of God 
In the religions of the world, God is usually portrayed 
in human form, with human qualities and attributes. The 
creation story in Genesis makes sense of this by explaining 
that God created man and woman in his own image. Feuer-
bach reversed this explanation, proposing that man makes 
God in his image, i.e., that human beings project their es-
sential nature onto the form of divinity. Thus theology is 
anthropology and the study of God is really the study of 
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human nature. Feuerbach's point is well taken: the Irnago 
Dei in the Christian and Jewish scriptures is clearly an-
thropomorphic. God creates, God speaks, God listens, God 
cares, God protects, God acts, God feels .. . 
William Blake called him the Ancient of Days and por-
trayed him as a white bearded , stooped, cloud-swept 
math emetician ... measuring his creation and his house-
hold. Others developed about him an imperial image, 
the exalted ruler of all men and nations ... Others imag-
ined him as a warm personality in whom one could 
confide. 23 
These are human qualities, or extensions of human quali-
ties to their furthest possible developments. God in other 
words, is encountered qua person in theistic thinking. 
Schachtel's discussion of the anthropomorphic dimen-
sion of projection emphasizes 1. the tendency to think of 
the universe in human terms; 2. the legitimacy of anthropo-
morphic thinking; and 3. the profound understanding of 
otherness that can be achieved only through projection and 
especially anthromorphic thinking. These points intersect 
with theistic religions in which the divine is viewed as other 
and as person. But how is Rorschachian projection relevant 
to non-theistic religions, religions which maintain that the 
divine is not other, and that the divine lacks human attri-
butes? Following are some speculations regarding Eastern 
and monistic religions. T he monistic view of the divine, I 
believe, can still be conceptualized in the vocabulary of Ror-
schachian projection in spite of an understanding of other-
ness, selfhood and their relationship which differs radically 
from the theistic view. 
Monistic Religions 
Two important points must be made prior to a discus-
sion of monism. First, the non-theistic position is a highly 
abstract theological stance which is neither limited to the 
Eastern world, nor typical of the "common person's" way of 
viewing the divine. T illich's God beyond the God of T heo-
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logical Theism for example involves a non-theistic view of 
the absolute. And yet Tillich's theology is clearly part of the 
Western Weltanschauung. Secondly, the non-theistic stance is 
not the theology of the majority, even in the East. T his is 
well documented in H induism and Buddhism. In monistic 
Hinduism one finds a belief in an abstract, non-personal, 
non-anthropomorphic divinity, Brahman. But along with the 
persistence of a monistic strain, theism is very predominant, 
especially in the doctrine and practice of Bhakti, devotion to 
a personal God who bestows grace. The situation is similar 
in Buddhism. In T heravada Buddhism a belief in God is 
entirely absent. The average devotee, however, in Bud-
dhism's Mahayana tradition has a myriad of Buddhas and 
Bodhisattvas to worship, love, and fear. Nor is it the case 
that only the "simple folk" are theists. On the contrary, 
many of the most sophisticated religious thinkers of the 
East have been Bhaktas , Mahayanists, or theists of other 
sorts. 
Viewing the divine as other, and as an other with hu-
man qualities, is not unusual in the East. T herefore Ror-
schachian projection need not be abandoned as a tool for 
understanding the image of and the relationship to the di-
vine in Eastern theism. However, let us also address the 
more abstract non-theistic positions. 
In non-theistic traditions such as U panishadic (Vedan-
tic) Hinduism the boundaries between self and non-self are 
not sharp. In monistic Hinduism the belief is held that the 
divine is mistakenly perceived as other only because the 
individual is in a state of ignorance, avidya. When in a state 
of knowledge or realization, the individual experiences the 
divine as self, not as other; the practitioner knows Brahman 
(the divine) as Atman (self or soul): 
The maintenance of ego boundaries, between "inside" 
and "outside," between "I" and "others"-and the sen-
sory experiences and social relationships based on these 
separations is the stuff of reality in Western thought 
and yet maya (illusion) to the Hindus .... All mental 
proceses are grounded in Chitta which has as its specific 
aim "I" awareness and fusion with the "Other."24 
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The momsuc position collapses the distance between 
self and other that the theistic position maintains. The mon-
ist comes to a realization that the divine is not merely other 
but is also self, and that self, other, and all things are divine. 
In the words of a classic Hindu saying from the Upani-
shads, Tat tvam asi: "that thou art," "you are everything," or 
"the human soul is one with the divine." 
Two facets of the experiential analysis of projection 
and the M response are helpful here. First let us recall that 
projection is an attempt to formulate the nature of self-
hood, otherness, and their relationship. While theistic reli-
gions focus on the divine nature of otherness, and monistic 
religions emphasize the divine nature of selfhood, neither 
entirely omits emphasis on the opposite pole or on the rela-
tionship itself. Secondly, in the M response, it is through the 
self that we know the other. Paradoxically, we perceive this 
knowledge as coming from the other rather than from the 
self: 
Movement perception is predicated on the conviction 
that what one is perceiving is truly other than one-
self ... the sense of otherness.is stronger and taken for 
granted .... Simply because it most clearly originates 
within the self it would seem least able to create a sense 
of otherness.25 
Schachtel states that the process of projection usually takes 
place outside of awareness. T he content of the projection 
may or may not be known to the person as being part of 
himself, but the process, i.e., the mechanism of perceiving 
the object in terms of one's own inner experience is gener-
ally not conscious. 
Applying this facet of Rorschachian projection to mo-
nistic religions, perhaps it can be said that monists r each an 
awareness of the process of projection, realizing that the 
perception originates in the self instead of coming from the 
other. Instead of concluding that the perception is thereby 
distorted, they conclude that self and other are one, and by 
extension that self is God , that Atman is Bmhman. In his 
existential analysis of the processes underlying the move-
ment response, Schachtel found that although it is unusual, 
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conscious awareness of the internal source of projective 
knowing is possible: 
The attitude typical of kinesthetic perception of the 
Rorschach inkblots is not that of a detached outside 
observor but one in which the subject experiences in 
himself the movement perceived in the inkblot. The 
degree of awareness of this experience varies. When 
there is marked awareness of the kinesthetic experi-
ence, the subject has the feeling that he knows from the 
inside how the object perceived moves. 26 
He describes a kind of projective knowing in which the 
internal source of the projection or of the knowledge is 
recognized, analogous to the Hindu concept of the compo-
site self wherein the individual develops and maintains an 
awareness of self within himself and within the other. Kakar 
emphasizes that "until this awareness of I in the composite 
self and in the generalized other is established and main-
tained, man, Hindus would say, is living in avidya: igno-
rance or false consciousness." 
The Buddhist understanding of self and other differs 
substantially from the Hindu view, but precise awareness of 
the nature of perception is not uncommon in Buddhist ex-
perience and literature. Buddhism denies the ultimate real-
ity of the self: the doctrine of anatta (no self, no soul) is in 
direct contrast to the Hindu elevation of Atman to equiva-
lent status with Brahman. Concomitant with Buddhism's de-
nial of self or soul, however, is an emphasis on the analysis 
of the processes and structures of the mind, an analysis 
unparalleled in psychological profundity among the world's 
religions. Buddhist meditative practice focuses precisely on 
awareness of mental processes. Intense and careful observa-
tion is applied to all experience, particularly to the mental 
states and perceptual processes: thinking, feeling, judging, 
sensing, etc. 
Buddhism denies the ultimate reality of the self, em-
phasizing instead the transitory nature of both selfhood and 
reality (otherness). In order to communicate the imperma-
nence of reality (anicca) and the insubstantiality of self 
(anatta) Buddhist teachings emphasize constant awareness 
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(mindfulness) of the processes of perception and analysis of 
the elements which seem to make up the self. T he focus is 
not on self and other, for self and other are ultimately 
illusory. T he task is to uncover their illusory and imperma-
nent nature by detailed observation of the relationship be-
tween them: the mental processes of perception. This verse 
by the Third Zen Patriarch emphasizes the Buddhist view 
of the relativity of self and other: 
When thought objects vanish the thinking subject vanishes. 
As when the mind vanishes, objects vanish. 
T hings are objects because of the subject (mind); 
The mind (subject) is such because of things (objects). 
Understand the relativity of these two 
And the basic reality: the unity of emptinessY 
Brown and Engler , in their Rorschach study of ad-
vanced Buddhist meditators, have drawn a parallel between 
the practice of Buddhist medita tion and taking/interpreting 
the Rorschach test. T hey suggest that both involve the 
awareness of the mental mechanics of perception: 
The Rorschach test requires a subject to attribute 
meaning to a set of ambiguous stimuli ... the experi-
menter learns something of how the subject constructs 
an inner representation of the world. This task is con-
gruent with the meditator's own practice, namely to 
analyze the process by which the mind works in creat-
ing the internal and external world . ... Meditation is 
primarily an analysis of perception of the world and 
how ignorance of perceptual processes contributes to 
human suffering. 28 
Projection, we postulated, involves knowing the other 
through the medium of knowing the self, while knowledge 
is perceived as coming from the other rather than from the 
self. Buddhism leads the meditator to investigate exactly 
that process of knowing: it invites an analysis of the ele-
ments of projective knowing. Buddhist meditation is an in-
vitation to epistemology. 
In non-theistic traditions the view of self and other is 
different from the theistic view. Rorschach's view of projec-
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tion, however, encompassing the nature of selfhood, other-
ness, and their relationship , is valuable for understanding 
both of these traditions. We need not limit our projective 
theory of religion to those religions in which the divine is 
other. Both knowledge of self and knowledge of other are 
involved in projective knowing. Eastern and Western views 
conceptualize self and other differently but both make the 
relationship between them central to their teachings. There-
fore the epistemological and anthropomorphic dimensions 
of projection are appropriate to the study of non-theistic 
and theistic religions. 
Rorschach's Movement Response, 
Object Relations, and Rehgion 
What are the "reasons as yet unknown" for the relation-
ship of religion and Rorschach's movement response? I sug-
gest that the ontogenetic origins of both religion and the 
movement response lie in the narcissistic period of human 
development, and that this common origin accounts for the 
relationship between them intuited by Rorschach. 
Several theorists have sought the origins of religious 
experience in preoedipal development, but few have in-
quired into the developmental origins of the movement re-
sponse. I would like to establish the origin of movement 
responsivity in the narcissistic phase of development by 
showing the relationship of M to several factors which have 
been specifically associated with narcissism. T hese include 
empathy, narcissistic identification, creativity, interpersonal 
orientation, and time sense. I believe that the crux of the 
movement response is in the relationship between self and 
other , and that the other factors associated with M stem 
secondarily from this. 
Object Relations Theory 
Object relations theory originated in psychoanalytic in-
sights. It focuses on I. the interaction between the individ-
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ual and significant others or "objects" and 2. the early rela-
tionship between mother and infant. The maternal-infant 
dyad is considered the most crucial relationship for the de-
velopment of selfhood and the capacity for relationship 
with others. The developmental period in question is the 
preoedipal period, also known as the narcissistic period or 
the period of early object-relations (the first few months of 
the infant's life). Central issues are self-other differentia-
tion, dependence and independence, merger and separa-
tion, sense of self cohesion and self fragmentation. "This 
stage is ... the source of the capacity to idealize others and 
to possess self esteem for oneself and the capacity to be a 
'single one' in relation to 'the other' ".29 It is also the source 
of the capacity for empathy. 
M and Empathy 
Gerald King proposed in 1958 that the area of inter-
personal relationship might be a "fruitful frame of refer-
ence" for a redefinition of Rorschach's movement response, 
M. Suggesting that M represents "the ability in fantasy to 
project the self into time and space in the interpersonal 
sphere," he demonstrated that the number of M responses 
is positively associated with the degree to which a subj ect 
defines a problem in self-other terms and is concerned in-
trospectively with the quality of interpersonal relationships. 
Self-other orientation or interpersonal emphasis in M has 
been emphasized by others as well. Dana enumerated six 
constructs to define Rorschach's M: tolerance for delay, ac-
curacy of time sense, high intelligence, high creativity, high 
fantasy, and an ability to conceptualize experience in terms 
of interpersonal relations.30 Schachtel's analysis of the expe-
riential dimensions of the Rorschach test suggests that M 
reflects the subject's ability to be attuned to the subjective 
experience of others. He indicates that the movement 
responses 
play a role in every act of empathic understanding since 
the subject cannot have an inner understanding of 
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another person's · feeling except in terms of his own 
experience of that or a similar feeling. In empathic un-
derstanding the projection of the subject's own feeling 
merges inseparably with the perception of the other 
person's feeling. 31 
Extrapolating from Schachtel's discussion, J. Urist fo-
cuses specifically on empathy and Rorschach's M. He de-
fines empathy by means of five dimensions of the self-other 
relationship and finds that M reflects some but not all of 
these components: 
M appears to reflect the following: a. the capacity to 
experience others via a sensitivity to their internal, sub-
jective experience; b. the capacity to cathect people and 
experiences as alive and human; c. the capacity to expe-
rience others as whole figures whose total personalities 
represent a complex integration of various affectively 
charged and more neutral attributes. 
Two additional elements of empathy, he finds, are not re-
flected in Rorschach's M. First is "intactness of ego bound-
aries": the subject may lack a sense of self/other differentia-
tion in Rorschach's M, but not in the experience of 
empathy. Secondly, M can represent narcissistic investment 
in a self-object whereas in true empathy "the tie to the other 
exists independently of narcissistic concerns."32 
Mayman also believes that M responses can reflect 
either empathy or narcissistic identification. He states that 
the kind of M response and the style in which it is given can 
reveal whether the subject is capable of empathy or merely 
narcissistic identification: 
Empathy is a higher level psychological attainment than 
identification .. . in empathy an experience is shared, 
in simple identification the self-other distinction is 
blurred or lost. In identification the ego becomes the 
other, or by projection, the other becomes an external-
ized facsimile of the self ... Identification dissolves the 
self-other differences in order to reduce to an absolute 
minimum the separateness of self from other; empathy 
does not.33 
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Mayman advocates a system of scoring these two types of M 
to clarify the distinction between empathic M and identifica-
tory M. 
Mayman's identificatory M and Urist's non-empathic M 
seem to represent the M responses that Schachtel calls "po-
tentially distorted knowing." Movement responsivity be-
comes distorted when it has a defensive function; when tan-
gential or partial data from the other person's behavior are 
used to "attach meanings taken from one's own life experi-
ence which do not correspond to the real and total picture 
of the other person's behavior"; or when qualities are as-
cribed to the other person "the presence of which in one's 
own life is unknown to him or which he tends to deny in 
himself." (Cf. Schachtel) Empathic knowing, in other words, 
is non-distorted knowing, whereas narcissistic knowing is 
more likely to be distorted. M therefore refers to the entire 
range of self-other relationship, from narcissistic identifica-
tion to clear perception and accurate knowing made possi-
ble by the separation of self and other. 
The Origins of the M Response 
Many authors have suggested a relationship between M 
and empathy34 but few have asked the genetic question of 
origins. Urist even commented on the importance of em-
pathy in object relations literature, and found M to repre-
sent some of the dimensions of empathy, yet he did not 
explicitly seek the roots of M in early object relations. Both 
Mayman and Urist believe that M can represent "narcissistic 
identification" but their use of the term narcissism does not 
imply developmental concerns. Schach tel as well avoids any 
genetic or developmental speculations, as is appropriate in 
an experiential analysis. One study, however, does indi-
rectly address the question of developmental origins of M 
responsivity. Bene studied the effects of the relationship 
with the mother on Rorschach M responses. Her results 
indicated that "the ability to make M responses (in boys) 
develops at an early age when the relationship with the 
mother is of overwhelming importance."35 Although Bene 
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did not elaborate her point, we can conclude that the M 
type of knowing, the knowing of the other through the self, 
originates in the relationship with the mother, in early ob-
ject relations during the narcissistic phase of development. 
In other words, the form of projective knowing that tran-
scends self and other originates in the mother-child interac-
tion. To make a Rorschachian pun, one might say M plus 
other equals mother. 
The Transformations of Narcissism 
Obj ect relations theorists have argued that erppathy 
arises from the early period of object relations. Kohut called 
empathy a "transformation of narcissism" and saw the source 
of empathy in "the fact that in our earliest mental organiza-
tion, the feelings, actions, and behavior of the mother was 
included in ourself." Empathy, he says, involves the ability to 
attain access to another person's mind. It stems from the 
experience of primary empathy with the mother which 
prepares us for the recognition that to a large extent, 
the basic inner experiences of people remain similar to 
our own. Our first perception of the manifestations of 
another person's feelings, wishes, and thoughts oc-
curred within the framework of a narcissistic concep-
tion of the world. 
Thus whereas others have linked M with empathy, Kohut's 
words point to the crucial element which has not been ad-
dressed: the origins of empathy (and therefore of M) in the 
preoedipal narcissistic relationship with the mother. 
Kohut finds creativity to be another transformation of 
narcissism. In creative work, he states, 
narcissistic energies are employed which have been 
transformed into . .. idealizing libido ... [The creative 
product] is cathected with narcissistic libido and thus 
included in the context of the self.36 
The creative person is attempting to recreate a perfection 
which formerly (during the phase of primary narcissism) 
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was an attribute of his own. Although the exact relationship 
between the movement response and creativity remains 
controversial, many studies have linked M and creative 
thinking. Rorschach himself made this association and con-
sidered "inner creativity" a very important aspect of M. 
Schachtel finds that the creativity expressed in the M re-
sponse represents a particular type of relatedness to the 
world, a creative factor in the act of experiencing which is a 
prerequisite for creative production. Kohut's clarification of 
the source of creativity in early object relations sheds light 
upon the reasons behind the association of Rorschach's M 
with both empathy and creativity. 
A third transformation of narcissism, Kohut maintains, 
is the capacity to acknowledge the finiteness of our own 
existence. The acceptance of the transience and imperma-
nence of objects we love and of our own selves is an accom-
plishment of the ego which is linked to "a valid conception 
of time [and] of limits." The rare feat of accepting one's 
own impermanence thus rests upon "the creation of a 
higher form of narcissism", a cosmic narcissism which tran-
scends the bounds of the individual. Kohut explains that 
the child's primary identity with the mother is the precursor 
of an expansion of the self late in life when the finiteness of 
individual existence is acknowledged: 
The achievement-as the certainty of eventual death is 
fully realized-of a shift of the narcissistic cathexes 
from the self to a concept of participation in a supra-
individual and timeless existence, must also be re-
garded as genetically predetermined by the child's pri-
mary identity with the mother.37 
Rorschach's M has been linked with a sense of the im-
permanence of the self in two ways. First, tolerance for 
delay and accuracy of time sense has been related to the 
movement response as has the tendency to project oneself 
into the past and into the future. These time oriented ele-
ments indicate an association of M with an awareness of 
transience and of impermanence in general terms. Sec-
ondly, Kuhn has shown that people who produce the rare 
Religion: A Rorschachian Projection Theory 223 
WM + responses* may, under the impact of grief, display 
increased creativity and "awareness of the finiteness and 
totality of human existence." These responses were also as-
sociated with p lacing a "high value on the past and on se-
quential aspects of existence."38 The fact that these qualities 
are characteristic of the WM + response rather than merely 
the M response, emphasize the difficult and unusual nature 
of these "transformations of narcissism." 
I believe that Rorschach's M response originates in 
early object relations. M represents a transformation of nar-
cissism, and it is the origin of M in narcissistic object rela-
tions that accounts for the divergent parameters of M rang-
ing from creativity, empathy, and religious experience, to 
interpersonal relations, projection, and time-orientation. 
The association of M with object relations is particularly 
relevant to religion, for the experience of religion seems to 
originate in early object relations as well. 
Object Relations and Religion 
Several object relations theorists have attempted to re-
think the Freudian critique of the role of religion in human 
life. Freud's normative vision involved a logical and rational 
"acceptance of the impersonal universe of factual reality, in 
which the only acceptable objects are genital objects of the 
opposite sex,"39 and in which dependency is antithetical to 
true maturity. The key to object relations theory's revalua-
tion of religion is its revision of the image of normative 
human life as isolated, alienated, and autonomous. Object 
relations theory revises the psychoanalytic image of psycho-
logical maturity and the direction of human development. 
Object relations theorists ... have redefined the prob-
lem which religion attempts to solve .... The life issue 
which defines religion is not the problem of guilt or 
powerlessness but the problem of separation . . . the 
problem of maintaining a sense of self in relationship.40 
* WM + refers to a movement response, M, which integrates the whole Ror-
schach card, W, into the percept. T he plus, +, refers to the good form quality or 
the realistic quality of the percept. 
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The central point in object relations theory's revaluation of 
religion is a revised understanding of separation and de-
pendency, of interaction with and dependence on the other. 
Rather than locating the origins of religion in the oedipal 
stage and viewing religion as a projection of the father im-
age, object relations theorists find the origins of religion in 
the infant's earliest relationships to loving persons, in the 
narcissistic period of development. 
By viewing religious experience as "of the same kind of 
stuff as human personal relationship experience" object rela-
tions theory avoids the psychoanalytic pitfall of viewing patri-
archal Western theism as the paradigm for all religions. It 
leaves room for the contribution of maternal images, non-
or prepersonal images, etc., to the view of the absolute. 
Object relations theorists agree on finding the source of 
religion in the narcissistic period of development. However, 
some theorists differ in their ideas of just what stage of the 
narcissistic period is most crucial for the origins of human 
religiosity . For two theorists, Kohut and Rizzuto, the entire 
period of narcissism is relevant to the emergence of reli-
gion. The emphases of other object relations theorists seem 
to fall into developmental stages within the narcissistic pe-
riod . The period of narcissism involves a gradual transition 
from a totally undifferentiated phase where self and other 
are not distinguished to a phase of clear separation of self 
and other, and an ability to tolerate the absence of the 
mother. Fairbairn places the origins of religion in the earli-
est undifferentiated symbiotic stage. Guntrip locates the ori-
gins of religion slightly later, in the early relationship of 
dependency wherein personal relationship begins to be pos-
sible and some differentiation of self and other has oc-
curred. Winnicott finds the antecedents of religion even 
later, in a "transitional realm" in which true separation 
from the mother becomes possible. 
Kohut and Rizzuto 
Kohut describes the developmental phases during the 
narcissistic period. There is a brief original phase of "pri-
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mary narcissism" which is inevitably disturbed. Two parallel 
and simultaneous lines of development begin subsequent to 
this disturbance: a grandiose self and its concomitant mir-
ror transferences; and an idealized parent imago or om-
nipotent object and its concomitant idealizing transferences. 
With respect to the idealized parent imago, he explains: 
The psyche saves a part of the lost experience of global 
narcissistic perfection by assigning it to an archaic, rudi-
mentary (transitional) self-object, the idealized parent 
imago. Since all bliss and power now reside in the ideal-
ized object, the child feels empty and powerless when 
he is separate from it and he attempts therefore to 
maintain a continuous union with it. 
In their attempts to preserve a part of the original ex-
perience of narcissistic perfection, the two basic narcissistic 
configurations create the ideas "I am perfect" (grandiose 
self) and "You are perfect and I am part of you" (omnipo-
tent object). These antithetical but coexisting mechanisms 
have been linked with religion and "mystical merger with 
God" by Kohut himself.41 Kohut's descriptions of the om-
nipotent other and the idealizing transference may be more 
relevant to a theistic and personalistic view of the divine as 
God whereas his comments on the gradual differentiation 
of self and other in the mirror transferences of the grandi-
ose self may be more appropriate to monistic or non-theistic 
expenences. 
Rizzuto, another psychoanalyst in the object relations 
tradition focuses not on the experience of religion but 
rather on the image of God. She argues that the image of 
God is formed in the narcissistic period; that maternal, pa-
ternal, and other figures in the infant's life contribute to the 
image; and that the image of God and the relationship with 
God change throughout the life cycle, even for non-
believers. Rizzuto notes that it is in the context of the pri-
mary experiences of knowing the other that the image of 
God emerges. Her work points toward a Kohutian analysis 
of the contribution of the idealized parent imago (omnipo-
tent other) to religion via the image of God. But she does 
not neglect the Kohutian grandiose self. She remarks on the 
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constant dialectic processes between primary object rep-
resentations and the sense of self [which] bring the pre-
oedipal child to form some representations of a being 
like the parents . . . who is "above all" and bigger than 
anyone else. This being becomes a living invisible real-
ity in the child's mind.42 
While Rizzuto's emphasis is on the image of God, Fairbairn, 
Guntrip, and Winnicott seek the source of the experience of 
religion. 
Fairbairn and Gun trip 
Fairbairn locates the source of religion in the earliest 
phase of primary narcissism: "the experience of symbiosis, 
or original relationship with the mother constitutes the 
deepest core of the religious imagination and is the histori-
cal source of the mystic experience of union with the 
deity."43 Fairbairn's view is similar to Freud's brief but fa-
mous speculation on the origins of the "oceanic feeling" in 
the union of mother and child. 
While Fairbairn focuses on the symbiotic stage of the 
maternal-infant relationship as a source of the experience 
of mystical union, Guntrip's work implies that the anteced-
ents of religious experience lie in personal relationship and 
dependency. For Guntrip the origins of religion seem to be 
in a stage of narcissism which involves some degree of self-
other differentiation, and a level of dependency with some 
degree of mutuality. Many of Guntrip's descriptions of reli-
gion focus on a sense of union or communion with the 
universe. His is a monistic approach to religion: 
Mature religion would express man's fundamentally 
dependent nature, in a relationship of emotional rap-
port with and reverence for external reality as a whole, 
immediate and universal.44 
Guntrip's emphasis is on oneness with ultimate reality, rap-
port with and reverence for the cosmos, at-home-ness in the 
universal milieu, and "communion with all that is around 
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us". He does not describe a transcendent theistic deity . In 
fact, when he does discuss the experience of "God" he de-
fines God in terms of this universal or cosmic oneness: "ma-
ture and sensitive minds will still experience a loving rap-
port with the all environing reality and will express this in 
personal terms as communion with God ."45 Guntrip finds 
the source of religion in the psychology of human personal 
relationship, yet he does not stress the personal component 
of the divine. Rather than the anthropomorphic or personal 
dimensions of the divine, his emphasis is on dependency 
and mutuality in a universal sense, a dependency which 
encompasses the entire universe in a cosmic system of mu-
tual interdependence. Thus although he defines religion as 
"the culmination of the personal-relationship essence of hu-
man living" he nevertheless does not emphasize mystical 
union with a personal deity. 
Guntrip's emphasis on a non-theistic relatedness to the 
universe is particularly appropriate in view of the phase of 
narcissism that he believes is most formative for human 
religiosity. The infant's experience of being one with the 
environment and having absolute power and control over 
the environment has been explored by many theorists. 
Awareness of dependence on the environment (or the 
other) precedes any awareness of self or other as person. 
This pre-personal, and non-theistic stance corroborates our 
earlier suggestion that projective thinking (the M response), 
similarly originating in early object relationships, is a rele-
vant tool for understanding both theistic and non-theistic 
religions 
Winnicott 
Winnicott places the psychological antecedents of reli-
gion at an even later developmental stage, although still 
within the pre-oedipal, narcissistic period. For Winnicott, 
religion and culture are produced/created/discovered in the 
transitional space, in the period of separation of self from 
other. Although Guntrip, Fairbairn, and Winnicott locate 
the antecedents of religion in different phases of the narcis-
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SlStlC period, all agree in finding the origins of religion in 
the relationship between mother and child , in the maternal-
infant dyad. Object relations theorists agree that religion 
belongs at some point on the continuum of self-other dif-
ferentiation; they see it as an extension of the paradigm of 
relationship. 
Winnicott believes that during the narcissistic stage of 
early development, the infant creates "transitional objects" 
in order to accomplish the necessary separation from the 
mother. The classic example of a transitional object is the 
teddy bear, selected from the environment by the infant 
and treated as if alive. The transitional object functions as a 
symbol of the mother's comforting and reassuring presence 
when she is absent. In one sense this object is an illusion, 
but in another sense it is real: it has a powerfully real effect 
on the child. Paradoxically, the transitional object is both 
real and illusory. 
Winnicott's Cultural Conclusion 
Winnicott draws two important conclusions from his 
understanding of the ability to construct transitional ob-
jects: a cultural conclusion, and an epistemological conclu-
sion. In cultural terms, this ability is the developmental an-
tecedent of all later cultural experiences such as religion 
and art. T hese cultural products are created in the "transi-
tional space" and require the capacity for play, creativity , 
and illusion. Winnicott locates religion in this "transitional 
realm," the realm between the self and the other, the poten-
tial space between the individual and the environment. 
Winnicott describes the areas of life encompassed within the 
transitional domain : 
Transitional objects and transitional phenomena belong 
to the realm of illusion . .. which is at the basis of initia-
tion of experience. This early stage in development is 
made possible by the mother's special capacity for mak-
ing adaptation to the needs of her infant, thus allowing 
the infant the illusion that what the infant creates really 
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exists. This intermediate area of experience . .. consti-
tutes the greater part of the infant's experience and 
throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing 
that belongs to the arts and to religion, and to imagina-
tive living and to creative scientific work.46 
Winnicott's cultural conclusion regarding the psycho-
logical source of religion and the arts confirms the ideas of 
Fairbairn, Guntrip, and others who find the origins of reli-
gion in early object relations. If the psychological anteced-
ents of Rorschach's M response and of religion both lie in 
the narcissistic phase of human development, we have con-
firmed Rorschach's intuition regarding the relationship of 
M and religion . It is due to their common origin that Ror-
schachian projection is applicable to the understanding of 
religion. 
Winnicott's Epistemological Conclusion 
In addition to the cultural conclusion drawn from his 
understanding of the ability to construct transitional objects, 
Winnicott also draws an epistemological conclusion. Epis-
temologically, the ability to construct transitional objects is 
the developmental antecedent of the process of knowing 
the other, a point which brings us back to Rorschachian 
projection. The ability to construct transitional objects is the 
developmental antecedent of knowing, and knowing con-
sists of a dual process of creation of the other (from within) 
and discovery of the other (from without). 
Winnicott describes the infant's process of knowing the 
environment: 
In health the infant creates what is in fact lying around, 
waiting to be found .... Yet the object must be found 
in order to be created. This has to be accepted as a 
paradox and not solved by a restatement that, by its 
cleverness, seems to eliminate the paradoxY 
Winnicott's paradox encompasses nothing less than the 
question of subject and object and how they are intertwined 
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in the process of knowing reality. Subject and object are 
inseparably interrelated as the human mind creates the ob-
jects it finds. According to Winnicott, we create what exists, 
we create the objects of the environment, we create the 
other. And yet, paradoxically, the other also exists sepa-
rately, apart from us. In order to know whafis outside, the 
child must create a representation of that other as a part of 
his inner world. Perception or knowing, therefore, is an 
active, participatory process involving both the self and the 
other. For Winnicott external and internal reality are inte-
grated, mutually influenced. What is external is simulta-
neously created by the individual. 
In Winnicott's understanding, knowing is a process in 
which the other is simultaneously discovered as other, 
created by the self, and perceived as other. Winnicott was 
speaking of an epistemological process very similar to that 
of Rorschachian projection. Projection involves knowing the 
other through the medium of knowledge of the self, while 
the knowledge is perceived as coming from the other rather 
than from the self. Winnicott's developmental paradox 
struggles with the same issue addressed by Rorschach's epis-
temological paradox: the issue of self, other, and their rela-
tionship in the process of knowing reality. Rorschachian 
projection results in a kind of knowing that like Winnicott's 
originates within the self, or between self and other, but 
need not cause distortion. Both of these views of knowing 
transcend the subject-object or self-other dichotomy without 
collapsing the polarity. In addition both of them involve a 
participation in a kind of body knowing, a somatic partici-
pation in perceptual experience. In Rorschachian projec-
tion (M responsivity) there is a "felt movement," an ephem-
eral body sensation. Through the body this grounded 
knowing of self and other occurs. Similarly in Winnicott's 
work, the point is made that the roots of perception and 
knowing are in the physical contact between the infant and 
the mother. T he nursing experience, the sensation of 
mouth and breast, the eye contact with the mother-these 
are crucial for the organization of perceptual experience 
and for the process of knowing the other. T hey are also the 
source of religion and culture. 
Religion: A Rorschachian Projection T heory 231 
Rorschachian projection like Winnicott's transitional 
space transcends subject and object, self and other, individ-
ual and environment. The realm of Rorschachian projec-
tion, like Winnicott's transitional realm is both the realm of 
religious experience and the realm of deepest knowledge of 
selfhood and otherness. Implicit in both Rorschach and 
Winnicott are an epistemological and a cultural conclusion. 
Culture (religion) and epistemology (knowledge of other-
ness and selfhood) are related in two ways: developmentally 
through their origins in early object relations and experien-
tially through projective knowing. 
Conclusion 
Rorschach's assertion that M "in its finest develop-
ments" is religious experience, becomes quite understand-
able, knowing the common origins of religion and M in 
early object relations. I believe that M is an index of the 
relationship between self and other, an index of narcissism. 
M can measure the continuum of self-other differentia-
tion.* T he entire range, from the undifferentiated percep-
tion of other as self to the clear and accurate perception of 
otherness is accessible to measurement by M. 
I have suggested that the understanding of projection 
emerging from an experiential analysis of M is particularly 
appropriate to viewing religion as projection. This is due to 
several reasons primarily related to the fact that projection 
and religion share epistemological concerns. First, because 
of its epistemological optimism regarding the knowledge of 
otherness, projection provides a legitimate means of under-
standing (radical) otherness. Second, in projection knowl-
edge of the other occurs through knowledge of the self, 
encompassing the same epistemological processes empha-
sized in contemporary theological interpretations of divine 
otherness. Third, Rorschachian projection can accommo-
date both theistic and non-theistic traditions in its under-
• Relevant in this context is Mayman's suggestion regarding differential scor-
ing of M responses. Mayman offered a set of criteria to differentiate empathic Ms 
from identificatory or narcissistic Ms. (Sec t·eference 19.) 
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standing of religion since projection and religion are both 
attempts to formulate the nature of selfhood, otherness, 
and their relationship. Finally, a discussion of the origins of 
M and religious experience established a further link be-
tween the two. It is due to their common origin in early 
object relations that Rorschachian projection (M) is most 
applicable to the understanding of religion. Both projection 
and religion emerge from a transitional or transcendent 
realm between self and other. Object relations theory en-
ables us to extrapolate toward both culture and epistemol-
ogy from Rorschach's movement response. 
Diane Jonte-Pace, Ph.D. 
Department of Religious Studies 
The University of Santa Clara 
Santa Clara, CA 95053 
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